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It Really Does Take a Village: Recognizing the Total 
Caregiving Network by Moving Toward a Functional 
Perspective in Family Law After Troxel v. Granville 
Lauren Worsek  
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2007, former teen pop star, Britney Spears, made 
headlines when she angrily confronted her mother, Lynne, in full 
view of the paparazzi, and presented her with an unidentified stack of 
papers.
1
 Allegedly,
2
 this mysterious stack contained a letter warning 
Lynne to stay away from Britney‘s two young sons and threatening 
legal action should she fail to comply.
3
  
In the photographs documenting this exchange, Lynne appeared 
shocked.
4
 This reaction made sense because until the recent 
commencement of this mother-daughter feud,
5
 Lynne maintained a 
strong relationship with her grandsons.
6
 Keeping this preexisting 
relationship in mind, it seems unnecessarily cruel to the boys to 
 
  J.D. (2009), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. (2006), 
Psychology and Sociology, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I would like to thank 
Professor Laura Rosenbury and Professor Susan Appleton for their helpful input. I dedicate this 
note to my late grandfather, Morris Davis.  
 1. This dramatic scene was documented in its entirety on film. Britney Spears’s Mom 
‘Brokenhearted’ over Rift, PEOPLE, June 29, 2007, http://www.people.com/people/article/ 
0,,20044145,00.html [hereinafter Spears’s Mom]. 
 2. Several sources speculated that the papers contained a restraining order against Lynne. 
See id.; Tears for Spears, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2007, at 36. 
 3. Spears’s Mom, supra note 1. 
 4. See id. 
 5. There was much speculation that Britney‘s anger towards her mother stemmed from 
Lynne‘s role in Britney‘s forced stint in rehab earlier in the year and for Lynne‘s friendly 
relationship with Britney‘s ex-husband, Kevin Federline. David K. Li, Britney Spears [sic] Ma, 
N.Y. POST, June 29, 2007, at 3. 
 6. See Mom to Brit—I Have Rights Too!, TMZ, July 6, 2007, http://iww.tmz.com/2007/ 
07/06/mom-to-brit-i-have-rights-too/10. 
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legally terminate their right to see their grandmother, especially over 
a completely unrelated feud between Britney and Lynne.
7
 However, 
under California law and in every other state in the country, courts 
must apply an automatic presumption in favor of the legal (typically 
biological) parents when determining matters of child visitation.
8
  
Although Lynne could petition for visitation under California‘s 
grandparent visitation statute,
9
 the law makes it difficult to override 
the direct wishes of a parent.
10
 In California, for example, 
grandparents such as Lynne may petition for visitation of their 
grandchildren when the children‘s parents are no longer married,11 if 
the court finds that ―there is a preexisting relationship between the 
grandparent and the grandchild that has engendered a bond such that 
visitation is in the best interest of the child.‖12  
However, this relationship alone is not enough to merit visitation. 
Instead, the court must balance the child‘s interest in maintaining 
visitation against the parent‘s right to exercise parental authority.13 
The statute adds an additional barrier when both parents oppose the 
visitations, forcing grandparents to disprove a presumption that visits 
would be against the best interests of their grandchildren.
14
 Thus, in 
 
 7. See supra note 5. 
 8. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-
Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 883 (2003) 
(―The majority of courts . . . apply a presumption that the parent‘s decision to deny or curtail 
visitation is in the child‘s best interest.‖). 
 9. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3103–3104 (West Supp. 2009). 
 10. See Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action by Grandparent to Obtain Visitation Rights 
to Grandchild, in 17 CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND 331, 361–68 (2001). 
 11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(b) (―A petition for visitation under this section may not 
be filed while the natural or adoptive parents are married . . . .‖). The legislature permitted 
exceptions to the divorce requirement when  
(1) [t]he parents are currently living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite 
basis[;] (2) [o]ne of the parents has been absent for more than one month without the 
other spouse knowing the whereabouts of the absent spouse; (3) [o]ne of the parents 
joins in the petition with the grandparents; (4) [t]he child is not residing with either 
parent; or (5) [t]he child has been adopted by a stepparent. 
Id. 
 12. Id. § 3104(a)(1). 
 13. Id. § 3104(a)(2). 
 14. Id. § 3104(e) (―There is a rebuttable presumption that the visitation of a grandparent is 
not in the best interest of a minor child if the natural or adoptive parents agree that the 
grandparent should not be granted visitation rights.‖).  
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the case of the Spears family, Lynne‘s future relationship with her 
grandsons could ultimately be at the mercy of her daughter‘s (and ex-
son-in-law‘s) desires, no matter how irrational they may be.15  
Family law in the American legal system operates under the 
principle that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in directing 
the upbringing of their children without undue state interference,
16
 a 
right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
17
 Generally, this interest includes the power to foreclose 
their children from third-party influences and relationships, even 
when such third parties have previously provided care essential to a 
child‘s upbringing.18  
Although this presumption originates from traditional notions of 
property and ownership,
19
 modern family law justifies the parental-
rights doctrine by the idea that parents are best equipped to protect 
the best interests of their children.
20
 Under this more modern 
 
 15. See supra note 5. This point becomes even more disturbing when one takes into 
account the prevalent rumors of drug abuse and erratic behavior by both Britney Spears and 
Kevin Federline. Emily Bazelon, Not That Innocent, SLATE, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.slate. 
com/id/2175128/ (detailing Spears‘s failure to comply with court-mandated drug tests); Ken 
Lee & Howard Breuer, Former Britney Spears Bodyguard Alleges ‘Drug Use,’ PEOPLE, Sept. 
17, 2007, http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20057339,00.html (discussing a former 
bodyguard‘s testimony in court regarding Spears‘s drug use); Nancy Grace: Headline News 
(CNN television broadcast Aug. 7, 2007) (noting magazine reports containing pictures of Kevin 
smoking marijuana). 
 16. See Maldonado, supra note 8, at 870 (discussing the traditional parent-centered 
presumption in the context of state third-party visitation statutes). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring that no State shall ―deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law‖).  
 18. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985) (―Parental autonomy 
strengthens the family and the entire social fabric ‗by encouraging parents to raise their children 
in the best way they can by making them secure in the knowledge that neither the state nor 
outside individuals may ordinarily intervene.‘‖) (quoting Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking 
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the 
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1984)).  
 19. See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 (Cal. 1974) (―[T]he doctrine of parental 
preference[] originally rested upon the theory that the right of a parent in his child was akin to 
that of a property owner in his chattel.‖); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, ―Who Owns the 
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 
(1992) (demonstrating that many of the landmark family law cases in favor of parental rights 
have been decided on a ―narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as essentially private 
property‖).  
 20. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2401, 2476 (1995) (―The filial bond is central to the lives of both parents and children, is 
intense and intimate, and requires privacy to flourish. This, rather than any notion of 
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approach, states typically recognize the need to create legal 
exceptions to the parental-rights doctrine—such as third-party 
visitation statutes—to account for instances when parents act in 
opposition to their children‘s best interests.21  
The actual best interests of the child, however, are at risk in many 
states in the aftermath of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Troxel v. 
Granville.
22
 In a four-justice plurality accompanied by two 
concurrences and three dissents, the Supreme Court delivered a 
fractured holding reaffirming the parental-rights doctrine as applied 
to the specific facts of the case.
23
 The narrowness of this holding 
leaves the states little guidance on how to apply this constitutional 
limitation to their own third-party visitation statutes.
24
 As a result, 
many states have erred on the side of caution when confronted with 
this issue, mandating that third-parties make a threshold showing of 
harm to children in order to successfully petition for visitation in 
opposition to the parents‘ wishes.25 This interpretation, which places 
an extremely high burden on nonparents, has the potential to cut 
children off from essential caregivers at the will of parents, no matter 
how irrational their decisions may be.  
Part I of this Note discusses the relevant history surrounding the 
Troxel decision and its aftermath. Specifically, it traces the historical 
development of the parent-centered approach, criticism and ultimate 
legal backlash in support of a functional caregiving model, Troxel‘s 
ambiguous reaffirmation of parents‘ rights, and the varied state 
attempts to apply this constitutional standard. Part II analyzes the 
states‘ varied jurisdictional approaches in applying Troxel and 
 
entitlement, is the justification for the initial deference to parental judgments about [their] 
children‘s interests.‖ (footnote omitted)).  
 21. See, e.g., In re Jasmon O., 878 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994) (―Children are not simply 
chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge 
from the interests of the parent.‖). 
 22. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 66–67; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Trouble with Troxel, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 695, 
695 (2001); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and 
the Courts’ Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. 
CT. REV. 14, 21 (2003). 
 24. See Maltz, supra note 23, at 709. 
 25. See, e.g., Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 320–21 (Iowa 2001) (requiring grandparents 
to make a threshold finding of parental unfitness in order to satisfy the presumption in favor of 
parents as required by Troxel).  
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demonstrates how they relate to functional theories of caregiving. 
Finally, Part III proposes that the law needs to do a better job of 
recognizing the importance of functional caregiving networks in the 
context of third party visitation laws. In order to achieve this 
objective, the Supreme Court should revisit its initial holding in 
Troxel. 
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TROXEL 
A. Traditional Conceptions of Caregiving: The Parent-Centered 
Approach 
In traditional family law, there is a default assumption that, absent 
state interference, the legal rights and entitlements of ―private‖ child-
rearing and custody vest exclusively in the parents.
26
 This long-
standing legal doctrine of parental rights,
27
 which can be traced back 
centuries in Western legal history,
28
 remains in American family law 
as a means of promoting social goals
29
 under several philosophical 
and legal theories.
30
 Under the ―proprietarian‖ model, parental 
―ownership‖ of their children stems from traditional notions of 
property law, where the law views a child as either an extension of 
the parent‘s body31 or a product of the parent‘s labor.32 Another 
 
 26. DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 98–99 (1993) (arguing that 
parents‘ claims to their children originate from common law notions of property based on their 
creation of the child and ―blood ties‖). 
 27. Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 643 
(2006). 
 28. Id. at 643–44. Roman family law was governed by the principle of patria potestas: 
―The authority held by the male head of a family . . . over his legitimate and adopted children 
. . . .‖ Id. at 643 (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1206 (8th ed. 2004)). This right extended 
to the life and death of each child. Id. at 643–44. A variation of this same theory prevailed over 
family law in the colonial period where the law entrusted authority over children solely to 
fathers. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 1–24 (1988) (describing the role of divinity in Puritan family 
structures).  
 29. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 15. 
 30. LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 8 (2d ed. 
2006) (dividing theories on parental rights into two categories: ―consequentialist‖ and 
―deontological‖). 
 31. ARCHARD, supra note 26, at 99. Aristotle promoted this idea, equating a child to any 
other natural product of its parent‘s body (such as a tooth or hair). Id. 
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theory, the ―blood ties‖ argument, assumes that that ―natural bonds of 
affection‖ make the parents the most qualified to provide such care.33  
Regardless of its specific justification, the parental rights model 
remains one of the dominant paradigms today.
34
 The Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed parents‘ fundamental right to direct the upbringing of 
their children on multiple occasions
35
 and in multiple contexts.
36
 The 
parental rights model results in an ―all-or-nothing situation,‖ meaning 
that one can either be a parent with vested rights and responsibilities 
or a legal stranger.
37
 Thus, under the parental rights model, any non-
 
 32. Id. John Locke argued that ―one owns the product of one‘s labour in virtue of owning 
one‘s body and thus one‘s labour.‖ Id. By associating labor with childbirth, this theory can 
extend to parental rights. Id.  
 33. Id. at 102 (―The ‗blood ties‘ argument says that parents have an innate tendency to 
bond to their children, and therefore . . . have a claim on their children which amounts to a right 
to rear.‖); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (explaining that, throughout 
history, the laws have ―recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children‖) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *446, *447; 
JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *189, *190). 
 34. See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a 
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 89 (2004). 
 35. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). For further 
discussion, see also Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 U. VA. L. REV. 385 (2008).  
 36. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (holding that parents have the right to direct the 
religious and cultural upbringing of their children and indoctrinate them into the required 
lifestyle); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (declaring that parents have the right to determine whether 
it is appropriate to expose their minor children to ―girlie‖ magazines); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 
(―[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.‖); 
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (concluding that a parent has a right to send their child to private 
school); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (holding that, because ―it is the natural duty of the parent to 
give his children education suitable to their station in life,‖ a parent has the right to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children by encouraging their child to learn a foreign 
language). 
 37. See Murray, supra note 35, at 398–99 (arguing that this zero-sum conception of 
caregiving legally excludes non-parental caregivers; see also Huntington, supra note 27, at 664 
(claiming that the parental rights model assumes autonomy from other actors in caregiving); 
David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and 
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 131 (Supp. 2006) (discussing the 
traditional bright-line rule that legal parents are ―entitled to custody of their children over the 
competing claims of non-parents‖); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 833, 840 (2007) (comparing the legal conception of childrearing to a triangle, with 
the child, parents, and state at each point but excluding all other actors). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/18
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parental third parties are legally extraneous to the child‘s upbringing, 
regardless of their functional role in providing care for the child.
38
 
B. Criticism of the Parent-Centered Approach and Reflections in the 
Law 
Despite the seemingly widespread pervasiveness of the parent-
centered approach, there has been significant backlash against 
traditional conceptions of caregiving during the past several 
decades.
39
 Taking offense to the narrowness of the traditional legal 
caregiving structure, social scientists
40
 and legal scholars
41
 have 
urged the law to incorporate a more functional definition of 
caregiving.
42
 Increases in divorce rates
43
 and mobility
44
 as well as 
 
 38. See Kavanagh, supra note 34, at 88 (―[A] legal doctrine of ‗exclusivity‘ pervades 
[modern] family law . . . .‖) (citing Bartlett, supra note 18, at 879).  
 39. See generally Roberts, supra note 23, at 16 (describing the academic trend in 1970s 
social science literature to recognize the caregiving contributions of nonparents and their 
importance to child development). 
 40. See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES 
AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 241–43 (1992) (discussing the importance of kinship systems as 
essential support networks in African-American families and the pathologization of these 
systems in the dominant discourse); KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, 
KINSHIP 109 (1991) (analyzing the fluid boundaries of ―chosen families‖ in LGBT 
communities); Bonnie Thornton Dill, Fictive Kin, Paper Sons, and Compadrazgo: Women of 
Color and the Struggle for Family Survival, in FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 431, 438 (Karen v. Hansen & Anita Ilta Garey eds., 1998) (noting the ―elaborate 
system of kinship and godparenting‖ serving as an essential linchpin to Mexican-American 
families); Niara Sudarkasa, Interpreting the African Heritage in Afro-American Family 
Organization, in FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra, at 91, 93–95 
(describing the inclusion of extended relatives in traditional African family structures and how 
African-American families reflect these models). 
 41. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the 
Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577, 640–41 (2000) (describing traditional Native American kinship 
systems and their legal recognition in tribal jurisdictions); Bartlett, supra note 18, at 881 
(arguing that even though children often form strong attachments to nonparental caretakers, 
―current law provides virtually no satisfactory means of accommodating such extra-parental 
attachments, however, because the presumption of exclusive parenthood requires that these 
relationships compete with others for legal recognition‖); Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by 
Law: The Disappearance of the Traditional Family and Law’s Refusal to Let It Go, 25 
WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 125, 129 (2004) (distinguishing modern family structures from more 
traditional models by noting that ―today‘s children form attachments to adults who are not part 
of their nuclear Family‖); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s in and Who’s Out?, 62 
U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 271 (1991) (advocating that ―unless we start to make family law connect 
with how people really live, the law is either largely irrelevant or merely ideology‖). 
 42. Martha Minow defines this concept as a fact-specific determination of whether a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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major advances in the arenas of civil rights,
45
 gender equality,
46
 and 
reproductive technology
47
 over the past fifty years highlight how 
cultural, economic, gender, and historical factors interact, creating a 
wide range of caregiving relationships separate from the traditional 
nuclear family structure.
48
 In addition to these sociological 
challenges, psychological studies began to question the legitimacy of 
the parent-centered perspective of caregiving.
49
 One report in 
particular found that children, prior to learning the actual legal 
definitions of family, categorize family members based on common 
residence and by daily contact.
50
  
Despite this criticism, the parent-centered conception of 
caregiving remains the dominant focus of family law in the United 
States.
51
 However, the law does embrace a functional view of 
 
group of people actually work together as a family unit. This includes considerations of the 
family‘s self-categorization, the way they present themselves to outsiders, and the sharing of 
affection and resources. See Minow, supra note 41, at 270.  
 43. See Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona: Best 
Interests to Parental Rights—and Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 720 
(2005) (―With more than half of all marriages in America ending in divorce, children are 
increasingly being raised in nontraditional families.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 44. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-
Dissolution Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 118 (2007) (―Approximately six percent of the U.S. 
population moves each year, and 6.6% of divorced and separated individuals move out of their 
home county each year.‖). 
 45. See Dill, supra note 40, at 442–43; Atwood, supra note 41, at 625–26. 
 46. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT 4 
(Penguin Books 2003) (1989) (theorizing that the significant growth of the female workforce in 
the aftermath of the Women‘s Liberation Movement has created a ―second shift‖ for women 
who feel social pressure to also maintain sole caregiving responsibilities at home); see also 
Anita Ilta Garey & Karen V. Hansen, Introduction: Analyzing Families with a Feminist 
Sociological Imagination, in FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra 
note 40, at xvii–xx (outlining various feminist perspectives on the family and their effects on 
the family structure).  
 47. See Minow, supra note 41, at 271 (discussing how development of in vitro 
fertilization permits a bypass of traditional rules of adoption and biological conception). 
 48. See Murray, supra note 35, at 390 (―In actuality, parents routinely rely on those 
outside of the nuclear family to help them discharge their caregiving responsibilities.‖). 
 49. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17–20 (1973) (claiming that children can form ―psychological 
child-parent relationships‖ with adults who have spent a considerable amount of time with 
them). 
 50. Minow, supra note 41, at 275 (citing Rhonda L. Gilby & David R. Pederson, The 
Development of the Child’s Concept of the Family, 14 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI 110, 117–18 (1982)). 
 51. See Murray, supra note 35, at 394–96.  
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caregiving in some narrow situations.
52
 In particular, third-party 
visitation statutes, which permit non-parental caregivers to petition 
for visitation against the wishes of parents, demonstrate legal 
recognition of functional caregiving models because these laws take 
into account the caregiving contributions of individuals outside the 
nuclear family structure.
53
 In most states, third-party visitation laws 
apply only to grandparents.
54
 Thus, even though pure functionalism 
focuses on actual relationships regardless of biological ties, this Note 
equates grandparent visitation statutes with third-party visitation 
statutes because both types of laws recognize the importance of 
caregiving outside the nuclear family. 
Across cultures
55
 and income levels,
56
 grandparents often play 
significant roles in caregiving, providing material and emotional 
support.
57
 Despite the regularity of such arrangements, however, the 
law historically bestowed no legal rights or protections on such 
 
 52. Id. at 415–32 (discussing the ways in which federal sentencing decisions, lifesaving 
medical care refusal cases, placement and jurisdiction of Native American children in the child 
welfare system, public assistance regulations, and open adoptions incorporate functional 
caregiving concepts). The Indian Child Welfare Act, enacted in 1978, follows a somewhat 
functional approach in its application. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006); see also Murray, 
supra note 35, at 419–22. Though Congress passed this law for the purpose of cultural 
preservation, its provisions promote functional theories by giving legal rights to extended 
caregiving networks. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1911–1923. The Act mandates that Native 
American tribal courts take jurisdiction over custody issues involving Native American children 
residing on reservations. Id. § 1911(a) (―An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to 
any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is 
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise 
vested in the State by existing Federal law.‖). In determining adoptive placements, courts must 
give preference to placements with ―(1) a member of the child‘s extended family; (2) other 
members of the Indian child‘s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.‖ Id. § 1915(a). Also, these 
jurisdictions must define ―extended family‖ in accordance with the law or custom of the tribe. 
Id. § 1903(2). For further discussion on child welfare under tribal jurisdiction, see Atwood, 
supra note 41.  
 53. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 15 (―Nonparent visitation statutes, not existent before 
the late 1960s, today permit grandparents—and often other nonparents—in all fifty states to 
petition courts for the right to visit their grandchildren.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 54. See id. at 15–16. 
 55. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 41, at 642 (―[I]t is common knowledge in Indian 
Country that both the maternal and paternal grandmothers traditionally play a very significant 
role in the Indian family.‖); see also Dill, supra note 40, at 430, 441–42. 
 56. See COONTZ, supra note 40, at 241. 
 57. See AARP, Family Relationships: A Grandparent‘s Role in the Family, http://www. 
aarp.org/families/grandparents/family_relationships/a2004-01-16-grandparentsrole.html (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
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arrangements.
58
 As a result, grassroots movements advocating for 
grandparent rights gained significant momentum in the 1990s.
59
 By 
2000, all fifty states had some variation of a statute protecting 
grandparents‘ rights to visit their grandchildren.60  
The concept of third-party visitation statutes runs counter to the 
traditional, parent-centered norms that have historically dominated 
family law. Thus, this counter-trend in the law faced immediate 
opposition.
61
 Parental rights advocates began to challenge 
grandparent and other third-party visitation statutes in state courts on 
constitutional grounds.
62
 Initially, most of these challenges failed.
63
 
However, by the mid-1990s, courts and legal scholars began to 
express concern about over-expansion of such laws and ―the 
corresponding encroachment of parental rights.‖64 This considerable 
shift in public opinion provides a contextual backdrop for Troxel, in 
which the Supreme Court ultimately addressed this controversial 
issue. 
C. Troxel v. Granville: Reaffirmation of Tradition 
Troxel arose out of the relationship between two young girls in 
Washington and their paternal grandparents, the petitioners.
65
 The 
children‘s parents split up shortly after the children‘s births, and the 
father moved in with the petitioners.
66
 The children‘s parents 
maintained a regular custody arrangement—the girls spent weekdays 
with their mother and weekends with their father and the 
petitioners.
67
 After the unexpected death of the girls‘ father, the 
 
 58. See Bartlett, supra note 18, at 881.  
 59. Karen M. Thomas, Generations Apart: Grandparents Are Going to Court to Gain 
Right to Visit Grandchildren, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1999, at C1 (describing that 
in advocating for grandparents rights, ―[o]lder Americans have organized nationally and wield a 
considerable amount of political clout‖). 
 60. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 n.* (2000); see also Stephen Elmo Averett, 
Grandparent Visitation Right Statutes, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 355, 356 (1999). 
 61. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 16. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 17. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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family initially continued the same visitation arrangement.
68
 Several 
months later, however, the mother informed the petitioners that she 
wanted to limit their visitation privileges to one short visit per month 
with no overnight stay.
69
  
The petitioners, invoking a Washington third-party visitation 
statute,
70
 filed suit in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County 
to obtain extended visitation rights
71
 with the children.
72
 In an oral 
ruling, the Superior Court granted petitioners one weekend per 
month, one week during the summer, and four hours on each 
grandparent‘s birthday.73 The Washington Court of Appeals reversed 
the visitation order, reasoning that unless a custody action is pending, 
nonparents (such as the petitioners) lack standing to seek visitation 
under the visitation statute.
74
 The Washington Supreme Court later 
affirmed on different grounds,
75
 and the Supreme Court of the United 
States subsequently granted certiorari.
76
  
The Supreme Court, in a fractured 6-3 opinion, affirmed the 
Washington Supreme Court‘s decision, thus rendering the third-party 
visitation statute unconstitutional as applied.
77
 Justice O‘Connor 
delivered the plurality opinion
78
 by first paying deference to the 
 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 60–61. 
 70. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994). The relevant section provides as follows: 
―Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, 
custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may 
serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.‖ 
Id. 
 71. Specifically, the petitioners ―requested two weekends of overnight visitation per 
month and two weeks of visitation each summer.‖ Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 700–01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Drawing on 
traditional notions of caregiving, the court noted that this limitation was ―consistent with the 
constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents‘ fundamental liberty interest in the 
care, custody, and management of their children.‖ Id. at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. Smith v. Stillwell-Smith (In re Custody of Smith), 969 P.2d 21, 26–27 (Wash. 1998). 
A divided court disregarded the lower court‘s treatment of standing, holding instead that the 
third-party visitation statute unconstitutionally interfered with the parental right to raise one‘s 
own children by failing to require a threshold showing of harm and by sweeping too broadly. 
Id. at 30–31. 
 76. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069, 1069 (1999) (granting certiorari).  
 77. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
 78. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer joined in O‘Connor‘s 
opinion. Id. at 60. 
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functional rationale behind the statute in question.
79
 Though the 
plurality recognized that such laws have a necessary purpose in the 
context of modern family life,
80
 it held that this particular statute 
unlawfully infringed on the mother‘s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
make decisions regarding the upbringing of her own children.
81
  
Referring to the statute‘s ―breathtakingly broad‖ language,82 the 
Court concluded that this law left any parental decision vulnerable to 
judicial review at the request of any third party.
83
 The Court took 
particular offense to the fact that the best interest determination 
required by this statute gave no deference to the parents, whose 
―natural bonds of affection‖ should motivate them to ―act in the best 
interests of their children.‖84 This exclusive naturalization85 of the 
parent-child bond gave further support to the Court‘s decision to 
affirm the Washington Supreme Court‘s holding and invalidate the 
existing statute in its application to the particular case.
86
  
 
 79. Id. at 64 (recognizing that ―children should have the opportunity to benefit from 
relationships with statutorily specified persons‖ such as their grandparents). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 72–73. This right, O‘Connor noted, ―is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.‖ Id. at 65. 
 82. Id. at 67. Specifically, the Court took offense to the fact that the language allowed for 
any person at any time to petition for visitation so long as the presiding judge determined it to 
be within the best interests of the child. Id. 
 83. See id. (explaining that the ―language effectively permits any third party seeking 
visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent‘s children to 
state-court review‖). 
 84. Id. at 68. The Court argued that, in effect, this lack of deference places a burden on the 
parents to disprove that the visitation is in the child‘s best interest once a third-party files a 
petition for visitation. See id. at 68–69. 
 85. The Court emphasized this point even further by playing down the importance of the 
grandparent-grandchild bond:  
In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between 
grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from 
perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be 
beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a 
fit parent‘s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the 
court must accord at least some special weight to the parent‘s own determination. 
Id. at 70. 
 86. Id. at 72. 
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D. Treatment of Troxel by State Courts 
Though the plurality opinion reaffirmed the traditional, parent-
centered approach to childrearing as a constitutionally protected 
right, its practical application is ambiguous. O‘Connor, emphasizing 
the case-specific narrowness of the plurality holding, declined to 
define the parameters of many of the primary issues of Troxel.
87
 The 
opinion deliberately abstained from invalidating all nonparental 
visitation statutes as per se unconstitutional,
88
 but also refused to 
define the constitutional scope for such statutes.
89
 Specifically, the 
Court left open the question of how much and what type of deference 
should be given to parents in response to a visitation request by a 
third party.
90
 In addition to the O‘Connor plurality, the Supreme 
Court produced two concurring opinions
91
 and three dissents.
92
  
 
 87. Id. at 73 (―Accordingly, we hold that § 26.10.160(3), as applied to this case, is 
unconstitutional.‖) (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. (―Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case 
basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due 
Process Clause as a per se matter.‖).  
 89. Id. (―[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the 
Washington Supreme Court . . . .‖).  
 90. Id. 
 91. Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, supported the plurality‘s judgment but noted 
that he would have affirmed the Washington Supreme Court‘s facial invalidation of the statute. 
Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence, pointing out the 
need for an appropriate standard of review for determining infringements on parents‘ 
fundamental right to raise their children. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 92. Three justices dissented in separate opinions. Justice Stevens argued that the plurality 
should have addressed the Washington Supreme Court‘s facial invalidation of the statute. Id. at 
81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens declared ―that a facial challenge should fail whenever a 
statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.‖ Id. at 85 (citation omitted). The Washington third-party 
visitation statute, he argued, qualified as such because there are a number of situations where it 
would be ―constitutionally permissible‖ for a court to grant visitation under the proscribed 
standard. Id. Though Stevens agreed that parents will probably act in their children‘s best 
interests in the majority of situations, he recognized that this cannot be assumed in all cases. See 
id. at 86. Thus, a parent‘s constitutional right to control the upbringing of their child ―should 
not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of 
parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child.‖ Id. at 
89.  
 Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, questioned the credibility of all precedent supported by 
the notion of parental rights as a judicially vindicated liberty interest protected ―under a 
Constitution that does not even mention them.‖ Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He expressed 
federalism concerns about these cases, noting that family law has traditionally been an area of 
the law reserved to the states. See id. at 93.  
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The narrowness of the plurality holding combined with the 
fractured nature of the final opinion provide the states with little 
guidance in how to address the influx of visitation requests by 
nonparents.
93
 Thus, predictably, states have varied in their post-
Troxel treatment of grandparent visitation statutes.
94
  
Many states interpret Troxel broadly in order to protect the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of parents.
95
 These jurisdictions have 
rejected grandparent visitation requests, either by finding the specific 
state law to be facially unconstitutional
96
 or unconstitutional as 
applied to the facts at hand.
97
  
The Supreme Court of Iowa, for example, used Troxel to 
invalidate a third-party visitation statute as unconstitutional on its 
face.
98
 The statute at issue, section 598.35(7) of the Iowa Code, 
permitted grandparents or great-grandparents to petition for court-
ordered visitation rights with their grandchildren or great-
grandchildren if the parents had unreasonably restricted visitation, the 
grandparents or great-grandparents had developed a ―substantial 
 
 Finally, Justice Kennedy dissented on two distinct but interrelated grounds. See id. at 93–
102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He first criticized the Washington Supreme Court‘s requirement 
that third-parties must make a mandatory showing of harm to the child in order to successfully 
petition for visitation. Id. at 94. This rejection of the best interest standard, he argued, undercuts 
―a basic tool of domestic relations law in visitation proceedings.‖ Id. at 99. In addition, 
Kennedy disagreed with the assumption supporting the thrust of the plurality‘s argument that 
parents are the primary caregivers of their children. See id. at 100–01. He pointed out that ―a fit 
parent‘s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another parent or a 
de facto parent may be another.‖ Id.  
 93. For further discussion, see Roberts, supra note 23, at 21–22; see also Murray, supra 
note 35, at 403–04. 
 94. Murray, supra note 35, at 403–04; Roberts, supra note 23, at 21. 
 95. See, e.g., Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 858 (Ark. 2002); Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 139, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Kyle O. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 478 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 434 (Conn. 2002); Wickham v. Byrne, 769 
N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ill. 2002); Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534 (Ill. 2000); Santi v. Santi, 633 
N.W.2d 312, 320–21 (Iowa 2001); Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2000); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547, 550 (Okla. 2000). 
 96. See, e.g., Wickham, 769 N.E.2d at 8 (―[A] fit parent‘s constitutionally protected liberty 
interest to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her children mandates that parents—not 
judges—should be the ones to decide with whom their children will and will not associate.‖). 
 97. See, e.g., Brice, 754 A.2d at 1136 (―[W]e hold only that the statute was 
unconstitutionally applied to the facts in this case, which are strikingly similar to those in 
Troxel.‖); Neal, 14 P.3d at 550 (―[U]nder Troxel, grandparent visitation in the present case 
violated . . . [the parents‘] constitutional rights . . . .‖). 
 98. See Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 321. 
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relationship‖ with the children prior to the petition, and the court 
found visitation to be in the best interests of the children.
99
  
The Iowa Supreme Court determined that this provision violated 
due process by ―fail[ing] to accord fit parents the presumption 
deemed so fundamental in Troxel.‖100 The court held that a threshold 
finding of parental unfitness was necessary in order for the state to 
give any consideration to a grandparent‘s petition for visitation 
rights.
101
 Though the court recognized the social desirability of 
grandparent-grandchild relationships, it concluded that, absent a 
required finding of parental unfitness, ―the statute effectively 
substitutes sentimentality for constitutionality.‖102 
Using almost identical reasoning, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
found that state‘s grandparent visitation statute to be unconstitutional, 
but only as applied to the particular facts of the case.
103
 As in the 
Iowa statute, the Kansas law allowed courts to order reasonable 
visitation to grandparents if there was a preexisting substantial 
relationship, and visitation was in the child‘s best interests.104 
Citing Troxel, the court emphasized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates a presumption that fit parents will act in their 
children‘s best interests.105 The lower court‘s decision, on the other 
hand, seemed to rest on ―the operative presumption . . . that a fit 
parent would not have denied visitation.‖106 Thus, the Supreme Court 
 
 99. IOWA CODE § 598.35(7) (2001), invalidated by Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 
2001), repealed by 2007 Iowa Acts, ch. 218, § 218. The new provision incorporating the 
holding of Santi reads as follows: ―The court shall consider a fit parent‘s objections to granting 
visitation under this section. A rebuttable presumption arises that a fit parent‘s decision to deny 
visitation to a grandparent or great-grandparent is in the best interest of a minor child.‖ IOWA 
CODE § 600C.1(2) (2007). 
 100. Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 320. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Dep‘t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962, 971 (Kan. 2001). 
 104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38–129(a) (2006). The provision reads as follows: 
The district court may grant the grandparents of an unmarried minor child reasonable 
visitation rights to the child during the child‘s minority upon a finding that the 
visitation rights would be in the child‘s best interests and when a substantial 
relationship between the child and the grandparent has been established. 
Id. 
 105. Paillet, 16 P.3d at 970. 
 106. Id. The Court of Appeals of Kansas had previously placed blame on the mother for the 
child‘s lack of a substantial relationship with her grandparents. Dep‘t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. 
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of Kansas concluded that because the lower court did not require the 
petitioners to rebut the presumption in favor of the children‘s parents, 
the visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied.
107
 
In contrast, many states have upheld grandparent visitation 
statutes in the face of constitutional challenges.
108
 These courts have 
generally construed the scope of Troxel more narrowly.
109
 For 
example, in Zeman v. Stanford,
110
 the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
upheld the state‘s third-party visitation statute as constitutional in one 
of the narrowest state interpretations of Troxel.
111
 In this case, the 
petitioners sought visitation of their daughter‘s children after the 
children‘s father obtained sole custody.112  
The children‘s father claimed that the Mississippi statute, which 
permitted grandparents to petition for visitation with their 
grandchildren upon a major change in the parenting arrangement (i.e., 
a court order granting custody to one of the parents, termination of 
the parental rights of one parent, or one parent‘s death),113 violated 
 
v. Paillet, 3 P.3d 568, 571 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (―Where [the mother] has prevented the 
grandparents from even seeing their grandchild, there is no way they could have formed the 
substantial relationship required by statute. . . . [The mother] is coming to this court with 
unclean hands and should not be allowed to hide behind the wording of the statute.‖).  
 107. See Paillet, 16 P.3d at 970–71 (―Such a decision would not allow a fit parent to limit a 
grandparent‘s visitation without losing the presumption that the parent is making the decision in 
the best interests of the child.‖). 
 108. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Rideout v. 
Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 294 (Me. 2000); Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798, 805 (Miss. 
2001); Douglas v. Wright, 801 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 
S.E.2d 674, 676 (W. Va. 2001). 
 109. See Murray, supra note 35, at 403–04 (describing how states upholding grandparent 
visitation statutes post-Troxel have found the plurality‘s scope to extend only to the point of 
prohibiting third parties from usurping parental authority over their children); Roberts, supra 
note 23, at 25 (noting that states have been generally reluctant to declare nonparental visitation 
statutes facially unconstitutional even in the aftermath of Troxel). 
 110. 789 So. 2d 798. 
 111. Id. at 803. 
 112. Id. at 799. 
 113. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(1) (2004). The actual text of the provision states: 
Whenever a court of this state enters a decree or order awarding custody of a minor 
child to one (1) of the parents of the child or terminating the parental rights of one (1) 
of the parents of a minor child, or whenever one (1) of the parents of a minor child 
dies, either parent of the child‘s parents who was not awarded custody or whose 
parental rights have been terminated or who has died may petition the court in which 
the decree or order was rendered or, in the case of the death of a parent, petition the 
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his constitutional right to control the upbringing of his children by 
granting the courts ―unrestrained authority‖ to interfere with his 
family‘s privacy.114 The statute required the court to make this 
determination by considering the best interests of the child and 
whether the grandparent had established a viable relationship with the 
child.
115
 He compared the Mississippi governing statute to the 
―breathtakingly broad‖ provision in Troxel in its expansive grant of 
discretion to the courts.
116
  
The court rejected the father‘s complaints, upholding both the 
statute on its face and the provision as applied to the petitioners.
117
 
The court distinguished the statute at issue from the Washington 
statute in Troxel, noting that an earlier Mississippi Supreme Court 
case
118
 determined that the provision here required the presiding 
judge to balance the parent‘s authoritarian interests against the child‘s 
and grandparent‘s relationship interests through the consideration of 
ten specific factors.
119
 These factors included (1) the amount of 
disruption that visits would bring upon the child‘s life; (2) the 
suitability of supervision at the grandparent‘s house; (3) the child‘s 
age; (4) the grandparent‘s age, physical health, and mental well-
being; (5) ―[t]he emotional ties between the grandparents and the 
grandchild‖; (6) the grandparent‘s ―moral fitness‖; (7) the physical 
distance of the grandparent‘s home from the child‘s home; (8) ―[a]ny 
undermining of the parent‘s general discipline of the child‖; (9) the 
grandparent‘s employment responsibilities; and (10) the 
grandparent‘s willingness not to interfere in the parent‘s 
responsibility as primary caretaker.
120
  
 
chancery court in the county in which the child resides, and seek visitation rights with 
such child.  
Id. 
 114. Zeman, 789 So. 2d at 802–03. 
 115. See id. at 803–04 (asserting that in the determination of the appropriateness of 
grandparent visitation, ―the best interest of the child must always remain the polestar 
consideration‖) (quoting Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912, 916 (Miss. 1997)). 
 116. See id. at 803. 
 117. Id. at 803, 805. 
 118. Martin, 693 So. 2d at 912. 
 119. Zeman, 789 So. 2d at 804. 
 120. Id. (citing Martin, 693 So. 2d at 916). 
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The court argued that these mandatory considerations would 
produce a ―‗narrower reading‘ that was lacking in Troxel.‖121 Thus, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi took a significantly different 
approach than other states by concluding that the presumption in 
favor of the parents as required by Troxel can be satisfied through a 
balancing of interests.
122
 
II. STILL HAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: THE CURRENT STATE OF 
THIRD-PARTY VISITATION STATUTES AFTER TROXEL 
Almost a decade after Troxel, the practical effect of the holding is 
still extremely muddled.
123
 By confining the holding to the specific 
facts of the case, the plurality left the states with an ambiguous and 
virtually unworkable standard to follow.
124
 This point is most readily 
manifested through the incongruous treatment across various state 
jurisdictions.
125
  
In the aftermath of Troxel, the states lack uniformity.
126
 Troxel 
illuminates only one clear guideline: courts must accord special 
consideration to the wishes of parents.
127
 Thus, the state legislatures 
and courts have generally made a point to include some sort of 
presumption in favor of the parents when drafting third-party 
visitation statutes and reviewing individual petitions.
128
 However, 
because O‘Connor‘s plurality declined to define the scope of this 
presumption,
129
 the degree of deference fluctuates by state.
130
  
Despite this seemingly parent-centered thrust, however, it is 
important to note that the Supreme Court supported functional 
 
 121. Id. at 803. 
 122. See id. New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia courts follow similar multi-factor 
approaches. See Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985); Harrold v. Collier, 836 
N.E.2d 1165, 1169–70 (Ohio 2005); State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 684–85 
(W. Va. 2001).  
 123. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 91–92. 
 125. See supra notes 95–97, 108. 
 126. See supra notes 95–97, 108.  
 127. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 95, 109. 
 129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 95, 108. 
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theories of caregiving in the text of the plurality
131
 and various 
dissents.
132
 In addition, O‘Connor explicitly limited the decision only 
to the facts of the particular case
133
 and refused to hold third-party 
visitation statutes as per se unconstitutional.
134
 This seems to indicate 
the Court‘s desire to uphold some sort of a functional analysis to keep 
the parent-centered presumption in check, leaving states to 
experiment in order to find the ideal balance. 
The states which have chosen to construe the reach of Troxel more 
broadly, such as Iowa
135
 and Kansas,
136
 clearly satisfy the 
constitutionally required presumption in favor of the parents that was 
absent in the statute at issue in Troxel.
137
 This approach rests on the 
traditional default that fit parents will make decisions that align with 
the best interests of their children.
138
 Thus, these states tend to require 
a third-party petitioner to make a threshold showing of harm to the 
child, parental unfitness, or other extreme circumstances
139
 in order to 
overcome this presumption—a burden which can be very difficult to 
meet.
140
  
The rigidity of this rule raises significant concerns. First, this 
tacticly renders children legally invisible by absorbing their interests 
into those of their parents.
141
 In addition, it penalizes non-traditional 
families by giving non-parental caregivers very little legal recourse 
when parents decide to terminate non-parents‘ visitation rights.142 
This is especially troubling when viewed in light of the well-
documented diversity of modern caregiving arrangements.
143
 
The Mississippi approach, on the other hand, provides courts with 
a more flexible standard to analyze caregiving arrangements.
144
 
 
 131. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 92. 
 133. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Iowa 2001). 
 136. See Dep‘t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962, 971 (Kan. 2001). 
 137. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
 138. See supra note 84. 
 139. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Paillet, 16 P.3d at 970. 
 141. But see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 42–43. 
 144. See supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text. 
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Though the Mississippi legislature essentially requires that the courts 
focus on the same three general concepts as most other states (the 
parents‘ wishes, the best interests of the children, and whether there 
is a preexisting relationship between the third parties and the 
children),
145
 the Mississippi Supreme Court chose to assess these 
concepts through a more thorough analysis.
146
  
The ten factors required by the Mississippi Supreme Court
147
 take 
into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the care of 
children, including relevant factors regarding the parents‘ right to 
control the disciplinary and educational aspects of their children‘s 
upbringing.
148
 These parent-centered factors include the suitability of 
supervision at the grandparent‘s house, the grandparent‘s ―moral 
fitness,‖ ―any undermining of the parent‘s general discipline of the 
child,‖ and the grandparent‘s demonstration of willingness not to 
interfere with the parent‘s responsibilities as primary caretaker.149  
III. TAKING CARE OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE SUPREME 
COURT‘S NEED TO REVISIT TROXEL 
The Supreme Court needs to finish where it left off and revisit the 
issues that it left open in Troxel. Specifically, the Court needs to 
define the constitutional limitations of the parent-centered 
presumption that O‘Connor explicitly avoided in Troxel‘s plurality 
opinion. The plurality created a sweeping constitutional requirement 
with virtually no guidance for determining the minimum level 
necessary to ensure protection of this right under current and future 
state laws.  
There are many possible explanations for the Supreme Court‘s 
restraint in providing a definitive legal standard. For one, this may be 
a reflection of political strategy. The Supreme Court decided Troxel 
amid heated controversy among advocates for parental rights, 
grandparents‘ rights, children‘s rights, and the rights of functional 
 
 145. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 147. Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798, 804 (Miss. 2001). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. 
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caregivers.
150
 The highly fractured nature of the Troxel opinion 
suggests that the Supreme Court was not immune to the tensions 
caused by this polarizing issue. Thus, the plurality‘s decision to 
confine the holding to the specific facts of the case
151
 may have been 
motivated by a desire to play to the middle and avoid being too 
controversial. Additionally, family law is generally a legal domain 
left to the discretion of the states, with little interference from the 
federal government. Therefore, the plurality‘s intention simply may 
have been to provide general guidelines while allowing the states to 
experiment with their actual application. 
Regardless of the plurality‘s reasoning at the time, the Court 
should take another look at the law in light of the conflicting state 
interpretations. Many states, such as Iowa and Kansas, have taken 
Troxel‘s required parental presumption too far by creating bright line 
rules which refuse to consider third parties‘ established relationships 
with children and the essential care that these relationships provide. 
The multi-factor approach followed in Mississippi, on the other hand, 
accounts for the circumstances in each individual case. 
This standard better supports the functional reality of family life 
in the United States through its recognition of alternative caregiving 
structures.
152
 Through careful consideration of the individual 
components of a child‘s relationship with a third-party caregiver,153 
the Mississippi approach lends support to individuals traditionally 
treated as legal strangers despite their actual contributions to the 
children‘s upbringing. This factoring of nonparent caregiving 
contributions into the overall legal analysis represents a significant 
step toward recognition of functional caregiving models in family 
law.
154
 Though this approach gives more discretion to the individual 
courts, the specified inquiry of the ten-factor test provides judges 
with a focused inquiry as to what factors essentially contribute to 
family functioning.
155
 
 
 150. See supra notes 58, 60. 
 151. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000). 
 152. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Most importantly, the Mississippi approach best conforms with 
the spirit of Troxel. When viewed in the context of the actual 
complexity of caregiving relationships, the Court‘s decision to avoid 
imposing an all-or-nothing standard to the detriment of essential 
caregiving networks makes logical sense.
156
 The plurality, through 
dicta, seems to indicate that some type of balancing of interests is 
required.
157
 Even the states that construe Troxel broadly recognize at 
least a minimum level of functional caregiving theory, as evidenced 
by the mere existence of third-party visitation statutes in all fifty 
states. However, mere facial recognition that such arrangements exist 
does not help when states construct their laws in such a way that their 
application virtually ignores functional caregiving.  
Thus, I propose that the Supreme Court revisit its initial holding in 
Troxel and require a totality of the circumstances approach to define 
the constitutional limitations in the context of third-party visitation 
laws. This will ensure that the spirit of the original holding is not 
destroyed in the states. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should not issue a ruling on a state law of 
such great constitutional magnitude without subsequently providing 
jurisdictions with a workable standard to ascertain how to remain 
within the scope of the Constitution. The current ambiguity in third-
party visitation law essentially permits courts to deny children access 
to fundamental caregiving relationships. Termination of these 
caregiving networks may be devastating to children‘s emotional and 
social development.  
The Supreme Court needs to provide a clear standard that requires 
states to carefully consider existing third-party caregiving 
relationships along with rights of legal parents. A totality of the 
circumstances approach breaks from the traditional, outmoded 
conceptions currently governing family law and recognizes the 
 
 156. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000). 
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diversity of caregiving structures. Unless it takes into account how 
American families actually function, family law cannot serve its 
intended purpose. 
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